

IAFF 6101

International Affairs Cornerstone

Lecture 12
Terrorism

November 15, 2016

Today's Class

- **Defining terrorism**
- The logic of terrorism
- Types of terrorism and terrorists
- Data on terrorism
- Explaining suicide terrorism
 - Market share
 - Nationalism
 - Salafi jihad
- Effectiveness of terrorism

A Trumpian Grand Strategy?

- Elements of restraint
 - Burden-sharing by allies on defense
 - Willingness to abandon alliances
 - Willingness to tolerate nuclear proliferation to certain (former) allies
 - Would rather not be involved in Iraq; “that’s not our fight”
 - Not 100% clear on Israel
- Elements of deep engagement/primacy
 - Increase defense spending – investments in conventional forces
 - Maintain unquestioned military dominance
 - Bomb the sh-t out of ISIS! In Iraq, Syria, even Libya; send U.S. ground troops to fight them
 - Junk the Iran nuclear deal
- Elements of I’m not quite sure what
 - Détente with Russia?
 - Extreme version of homeland defense – stopping Muslim immigration, deporting undocumented immigrants, building a border fence
 - Economic nationalism – junk TPP, renegotiate NAFTA, designate China a currency manipulator

What is Terrorism?

- Political
- Violent
- Victims ≠ Target
- Carried out by an organization...that is **not** a state
- Hoffman: “The **deliberate** creation and exploitation of **fear** through **violence** or the threat of violence in pursuit of **political** change” (1998, 43).

Anything Left Out?

- Nature of the target – civilians!

Terrorism, not Terrorists

- Hoffman conflates **terrorism** with **terrorists**
- Terrorism = tactic or strategy
- Different kinds of actors can use that tactic/strategy
- Byman on Islamic State
 - IS uses terrorism, but it's more than just a terrorist group – insurgency, conventional war, governance

Terrorism and Compellence

$$R = B \times P(B) - C \times P(C)$$

- R Value of resistance
- B Expected benefits of resistance
- P(B) Probability of attaining those benefits
- C Expected costs of resistance
- P(C) Probability of incurring costs
- Compellence succeeds when $R < 0$

Gradations of Terrorist Violence

- Demonstrative
- Destructive
- Suicide
 - Generates most coercive leverage
 - Most destructive
 - Communicates resolve

Left-Wing

- Marxist-Leninist, Maoist
- Overthrow government, institute socialism
- Two types
 - Small, not very violent
 - Red Army Faction, Red Brigades
 - Large and violent
 - Shining Path, FARC, VC

Right-Wing

- Racist, anti-immigrant
 - Neo-Nazis
 - White supremacists
- Anti-leftists
 - United Self-Defense Forces (AUC, Colombia)

Ethnonationalists

- National self-determination
- Control over territory
 - Tamil Tigers (LTTE)
 - Kurds in Turkey (PKK)
 - Palestinians
 - Kashmiri Muslims

Religious/Jihadists

- Goal: overthrow secular rule in own/other states, establish the rule of a particular religion
 - Al-Qaeda
 - Islamic State
 - Armed Islamic Group (Algeria, 1990s)
 - Taliban (hybrid)


Problems with Data on Terrorism

- USG has changed the way it counts terrorist incidents twice since 9/11
 - Before 2003, only data on “international terrorism” was collected – and not very well
 - From 2004-2011, NCTC tracked all terrorism using its Worldwide Incident Tracking System (WITS)
 - Starting in 2012, State Dept. contracted with START to provide statistical data using its Global Terrorism Dataset (GTD)
 - WITS criteria: politically motivated attacks that target noncombatants
 - GTD criteria: political/economic/religious/social motivation, target noncombatants, aimed at broader audience
- Because of inconsistent counting rules, it is difficult to compare frequency of terrorism over time

Basic Facts on Terrorism: 2015


- 11,774 total attacks
 - 13% less than in 2014
- 28,328 total deaths
 - 14% less than in 2014
 - 24% of deaths = perpetrators of terrorism
- 92 countries with terrorist attacks
 - 55% of all attacks in 5 countries: Iraq, Afghan, Pakistan, India, Nigeria
 - 74% of all deaths in 5 countries: Iraq, Afghan, Nigeria, Syria, Pakistan
- Almost 50% of terrorist attacks kill no one; only 5% kill 10 or more
- Most common tactic = bombing/explosion (52%)

Number of Terrorist Attacks, 2005-2015




Source: *Country Reports on Terrorism*

Deaths from Terrorism, 2005-2015




Source: *Country Reports on Terrorism*

Number of Terrorist Attacks in Iraq and Afghanistan, 2005-2015




Source: *Country Reports on Terrorism*

5 Leading Perpetrators of Terrorism in 2015




Source: *Country Reports on Terrorism*

Average Lethality of Attacks by 5 Most Prolific Terrorist Groups in 2015




Source: *Country Reports on Terrorism*

Suicide Attacks, 1982-2015




Source: Chicago Project on Security and Terrorism

Locations with Most Suicide Attacks, 1982-2015




Source: Chicago Project on Security and Terrorism

Locations with Most Deaths from Suicide Attacks, 1982-2016




Source: Chicago Project on Security and Terrorism

Largest Suicide Campaigns, 1982-2016



Source: Chicago Project on Security and Terrorism

Most Prolific Groups, Suicide Bombing, 1982-2016



Source: Chicago Project on Security and Terrorism


Market-Share Model

- Suicide terrorism is product of competition among terrorist groups for popular support (Bloom 2004)
- Much like democratic politics
 - Driven by public opinion
 - Armed groups respond to public opinion, compete for popularity

Market-Share Model: Problems

- Driven largely by a single case (Palestinians)
- Has occurred in places where inter-group competition was absent – Sri Lanka
- ST deeply unpopular in Iraq – but there was tons of it!
- Statistical studies find little support for the argument
- Palestinian public opinion doesn't track with ST anymore

Palestinian Suicide Attacks and Public Opinion



Nationalist Model (Pape)

- Suicide terrorists = Nationalists
 - Driven by goal of ending “foreign” occupation of the homeland
- Targets = democracies. Why?
 - Democracies are soft; public has ability to influence policy
 - Democracies are nicer
 - Easier to organize in democracies b/c of freedoms
- ST spreads because it works. Why does it work?
 - Objectives are relatively minor
- Policy Implication?
 - Defense, and **avoid occupations at all costs!**

Nationalist Model: Problems

- Data
 - 1981-2001: 188 attacks, 5,397 deaths
 - 2002-2015: 4,616 attacks, 37,362 deaths
- Selection on the dependent variable
 - Looked only at cases where ST occurred, not at all countries, or even only occupied countries
- ST, no occupation
 - 45 countries, many of them not occupied
 - Pakistan, Syria, Nigeria, Yemen, Sri Lanka, Lebanon, Libya, Turkey, Egypt...
- Occupiers not primary targets of ST; locals are
- Civilians not primary targets of ST; military is
- Many suicide bombers are foreign fighters – not from the occupied country
- Religion?

Jihad Model

- Religion facilitates extreme violence:
 - Good vs. Evil
 - Enemy = infidels
 - Take orders from God
 - Not afraid of death
- ST spreading across the globe, including many places with no foreign occupation

Jihad Model

- ST Old-Style = Local
 - Conflict – long-standing
 - Ideology – varied
 - Actors – subnational, recruit locally
 - Targets and goals – narrow and local
- ST New-Style = Transnational
 - Conflict – can be new
 - Ideology – Salafi Jihad
 - Actors – transnational, recruit all over
 - Second-hand humiliation rather than direct; role of internet and social media
 - Targets and goals – broad and unlimited
 - Attacks not limited to conflict zone
 - AQ attacks on “far enemy”, IS attacks in Europe

Jihad Model

- Rise of AQ and shift from “near” to “far” enemy in mid-1990s
- Advocacy of ST by AQ
- Spread of Salafi Jihad

Jihad Model

- Of 788 ST attacks where identity of perpetrating group is known:
 - 38% Salafi Jihadist
 - 19% Nationalist/separatist
 - 18% Hybrid
- 74% of attacks where group is unknown occurred in Iraq

Jihad Model

- Policy Implications?
 - Largely beyond our control?

Jihad Model: Problems

- More than half of cases occurred in Iraq
- Important groups were not SJ
- Eras of suicide terrorism?

Terrorism is Effective

- ST spreading because it works!
- Groups obtained concessions in more than 50% of the cases
- Why?
 - Weak form of punishment, but concessions are small
- Cannot achieve major objectives

Terrorism Is a Failure

- 28 FTOs with 42 policy objectives
- Terrorists rarely achieve their political objectives, especially when they target civilians
 - 7% overall success rate
 - 0% when primary targets are civilian
- Why?
 - Correspondent-inference theory: observers infer intentions from outcomes
 - Infer maximalist objectives from killing civilians
 - Targets refuse to make concessions

Terrorism Is a Failure

- 104 rebel groups in civil wars from 1989-2004, 23 of which used terrorism
- Groups that use terrorism are less likely to win civil wars, or even achieve a negotiated settlement
- Why?
 - No direct military value
 - Not useful for taking territory
 - Low cost tool, but may signal weakness
 - Drives away potential supporters
 - Helps gov't justify draconian measures in response

Conditional Views on Terrorism

- Extreme violence and terrorism has benefits for Islamic State
 - Recruiting boon
 - Deters rebellion in areas IS controls
 - “repression works, but not in moderation”
- But it also has drawbacks
 - Terrorizing the population breeds hatred and resentment
 - If IS starts to lose, people will be out for revenge